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Fair,efficient,and secure Cooperation incentive mechanism for multihop cellular networks

Platform : java

IEEE Projects Years : 2012 - 13

Fair,efficient,and secure Cooperation incentive mechanism for multihop cellular networks






       MULTIHOP cellular network (MCN) is a network architecture that incorporates the ad hoc characteristics into the cellular system however, selfish nodes usually do not cooperate but make use of the cooperative nodes to relay their packets, which has a negative effect on the network fairness and performance. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient incentive mechanism to stimulate the node cooperation. Our mechanism applies a fair charging policy by charging the source and destination nodes when both of them benefit from the communication. To implement this charging policy efficiently, hashing operations are used in the ACK packets to reduce the number of public-key-cryptography operations. Moreover, reducing the overhead of the payment checks is essential for the efficient implementation of the incentive mechanism due to the large number of payment transactions.




Existing System




However, the efficient implementation of the existing incentive mechanisms is questionable because they impose significant overhead. First, the fair charging policy is to charge both the source and destination nodes when both of them benefit from the communication. To securely implement this charging policy, two signatures are usually required per message to prevent payment repudiation and manipulation.


 Nevertheless, the extensive use of the public key cryptography is very costly, which degrades the network performance and stimulates the nodes to behave selfishly. Second, since a trusted party may not be involved in the communication sessions, the nodes usually compose undeniable proof of packet relaying called check, and submit the checks to a central unit called the accounting center for clearance. However, submitting and processing a large number of checks implies significant communication and computation overhead and implementation complexity.






Proposed System




          In this paper, we propose FESCIM, a Fair, Efficient, and Secure Cooperation Incentive Mechanism, to stimulate the node cooperation in MCN. In order to efficiently and securely charge the source and destination nodes, the lightweight hashing operations are used in the ACK packets to reduce the number of public-key-cryptography operations. The destination node generates a hash chain and signs its root, and acknowledges message reception by releasing a hash value from the hash chain. In this way, the destination node generates a signature per group of messages instead of generating a signature per message. Furthermore, instead of generating a check per message.




Software Requirements :


            Operating system                    :           Windows7


            Front End                                :           Java


            Back End                                :           DATABASE,SQL Server2005


Hardware Requirements :


            Processor                                 :           Pentium Dual Core 2.00GHZ


            Hard disk                                :           40GB


            Mouse                                     :           PC tech


            RAM                                       :           2GB(minimum)


            Keyboard                                :           120keys enhanced






Attacker model:


An adversary may compromise and fully control a subset of the sensor nodes, enabling him to mount various kinds of attacks. For instance, he can inject false data packets into the network and disrupt local control protocols such as localization, time synchronization, and route discovery process. Furthermore, he can launch denial-of-service attacks by jamming the signals from benign nodes. However, we place some limits on the ability of the adversary to compromise nodes. We note that if the adversary can compromise major fraction nodes of the network, he will not need nor benefit much from the deployment of replicas. To amplify his effectiveness, the adversary can also launch a replica node attack, which is the subject of our investigation. We assume that the adversary can produce Many replica nodes and that they will be accepted as a legitimate part of the network. We also assume that the attacker attempts to employ as many replicas of one or more compromised sensor nodes in the network as will be effective for his attacks. The attacker can allow his replica nodes to randomly move or he could move his replica nodes in different patterns in an attempt to frustrate our proposed scheme.




Initialization and Key Predistribution:


Our scheme employs multiple one-way hash chains  to secure the Deluge protocol. Hash chains1 are based on a function H with the property that its computation is easy, whereas its inverse H_1 is extremely difficult to compute. A hash chain with length L is generated by applying H to an initial element repeatedly for L times .. The last value after H has been applied L times is called the committed value of the hash chain . Before the sensor nodes are deployed, the base station constructs S hash chains. It generates S distinct random seed numbers and computes a one-way hash chain with length of L þ 1 starting from each seed.  predistribution will not incur the overhead of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol , and .key agreement between the base station and all sensor nodes would require Diffie-Hellman exchanges for each node if the Diffie-Hellman approach is adopted.








Packet preprocessing




In this module  we describe the packet preprocessing of the very first packet of program image. The   omitted value of the first key chain is used to encrypt the next key element in the order of key dissemination (K1;1 in Fig. 1). The encrypted result  is the key update segment for the first hop group. Then, K1 is concatenated with P0 and the result is hashed, yielding the packet authentication segment . The key update segments and packet authentication segments for the successive hop groups are generated in the same way using their corresponding key chains. Finally, all these segments are concatenated with giving the first packet to be transmitted. The way in which the key update and packet authentication segments are concatenated with the data packet is used in a countermeasure against tunnel attack. The above packet preprocessing procedure is repeated for successive packets in the image to be broadcast




Packet verification:


In this section, the packet verification for the first data packet destined to the first hop group will be described. The verification of subsequent packets in the other hop groups uses the same procedure with keys corresponding to those that were used in the packet preprocessing. After the preprocessing of a packet and the respective concatenation  is transmitted to nodes in the first hop group. After retrieving the correct  group information from P00 , the sensor nodes verify the key update segment  and packet authentication  segments




Security analysis:


The nodes are assumed to be uniformly distributed. If an adversary wants to broadcast a malicious packet to k in our scheme successfully, it will have to compromise all the upstream neighbors of k. Otherwise, the compromised  node will not have enough time to forge a malicious packet to circumvent our scheme . Similarly, we can further estimate the number of nodes (i.e. downstream neighbors) that might be affected by node k if node k is compromised. If we assume that the sensor nodes are uniformly distributed, the estimated number of upstream neighbors of node.









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